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LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL. A TREMOR ON THE
REGULATORY TAKINGS RICHTER SCALE
I. INTRODUCrION
The Fifth Amendment states, m part, that private property may
not be "taken" by the government for public use without the pay-
ment of just compensation.' Unresolved by this clause, however, is
exactly what type of governmental action is required to constitute a
"taking". Perhaps the framers of the Constitution intended the just
compensation requirement to apply only to actual physical seizures
of private property by the government.2 However, it seems plausi-
ble that at some point, certain non-acquisitive governmental actions,
such as extensive regulation of private property, may rise to the
level of a physical seizure, and thus subject the government to the
just compensation requirement.3
The United States Supreme Court examined this argument, that
certain governmental regulations may constitute takings, in Lucas v.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the Fifth Amendment directly applies only to the
federal government, its principles, along with other provisions in the Bill of Rights, are
applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R.
Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897).
The limitation on the taking of private property can also be viewed as a recognition
of the government's power of eminent domain and the limitations thereon; eminent do-
main is the ability to take privately owned property upon the payment of adequate com-
pensation. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946) (discussing the
importance of eminent domain as a mechanism for preventing individual land owners from
subordinating congressional power to their own personal wills).
2. FRED BOSSE.MAN, Er AL., THm TA.INO ISSUE 51 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvama Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 422 (1922) (hold-
ing that a state regulation prohibiting a coal company from mining coal on certain land
constituted a taking, stating that when regulations reach "a certain magnitude, in most if
not in all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sus-
tain the act').
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South Carolina Coastal Council.4 In that case, David Lucas con-
tended that a South Carolina law, prohibiting the construction of
any halbitable structure on land which he owned on a barrier is-
land, amounted to a taking.5 He argued that the legislative build-
ing prohibition completely destroyed the economic value of his
beachfront property, and thus entitled him to compensation, despite
the fact that regulation of the property was a valid exercise of the
state's police power. In response, the Court expressly adopted, as a
categorical rule, the notion that a government regulation which
demes all economically beneficial or productive land use constitutes
a taking unless the regulated use is considered a nuisance under
state law 6
At first glance, this ruling seems like an earthquake on the
foundation of governmental regulatory power. For example, the
categorical rule seemingly could enable many industries to claim
that various environmental regulations have prohibited certain prop-
erty uses thereby, rendering their property economically worthless.
In such cases, the requirement of just compensation would arguably
have a chilling effect on the further promulgation and enforcement
of these environmental regulations and other types of land use
regulation.
Upon closer inspection, however, the Lucas categorical rule is
merely a tremor on the "takings Richter scale" Standing alone,
Lucas is unlikely to change the current state of land-use regulation.
First, the Court left unresolved the question of what constitutes the
"deprivation of all economically feasible use" required to invoke
the categorical rule.7 As a result, in any future case, government
regulators can forcefully argue that a particular regulation has not
denied a property owner of all feasible economic use, and thus is
not subject to the just compensation requirement. Therefore, the
extent of the rule's impact on land-use regulation will remain un-
clear until future cases develop "the deprivation of all economically
feasible use" standard. Furthermore, as will be developed in this
Comment, the rule, together with its nuisance exception, results in
the consideration of the same factors analyzed in prior takings
cases. Thus, the rule is merely a shorthand identification of those
situations where government regulations would have been consid-
4. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
5. Id. at 2890.
6. Id. at 2899-2901.
7. Id. at 2894 n.7.
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ered a taking under prior takings law In short, the existence of the
categorical rule is unlikely to change the outcome in future takings
cases from the outcome which would have resulted prior to Lucas.
Lucas may, however, be a tremor because the mere adoption of a
categorical rule could signal the beginning of a doctrinal shift in
the continuing development of takings jurisprudence.
To fully understand the significance of Lucas and the categori-
cal rule it sets forth, this Comment will first outline takings princi-
ples developed prior to Lucas.' It will then discuss the facts and
arguments of Lucas, as well as the Court's decision.9 Finally, this
Comment will analyze the categorical rule, considering the prior
takings principles, and will conclude that Lucas, by itself, will not
be the earthquake which destroys the foundation of government
regulatory powers."
II. BACKGROUND: TAKINGS LAW
Takings law has not been analyzed under a single framework
or theory " In fact, Supreme Court rulings in the takings area
have been described as a "'crazy quilt pattern' of rulings." 2 This
description reflects the Court's difficulty in developing a formula
for determining exactly what type of governmental actions consti-
tute takings. This difficulty has resulted in the development of
several factors to be weighed on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether a challenged regulation is a taking.
A. Development of Regulatory Takings
Some scholars maintain that the original intent of the framers
of the Constitution supports the position that only a physical sei-
zure of private property by the government amounts to a taking
13
8. See infra notes 11-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 96-179 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 180-201 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987) (intenal citation omitted) (stating that the "Court has generally 'been unable to
develop any "set formula- for determining when "justice and fairness" require that eco-
nouc injunes caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons").
12. JoiN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONsTITTONAL LAW 403 (3rd ed. 1986) (quoting
Allison Dunham, Gnggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Tlury Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63 (1962)).
13. See BOSSLEMAN, Er AL., supra note 2, at 104 (noting that the Fifth Amendment
was adopted at a time when land-use regulation was standard practice, and that there "is
no evidence that the founding fathers ever conceived that the talang clause could ever
19931
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For example, Justice Harlan viewed the "taking" requirement liter-
ally, and felt that compensation was not due without a physical
appropriation of private property by the government.14 In Mugler
v. Kansas,5 Justice Harlan ruled that Kansas legislation prohibit-
ing the manufacture of liquor did not amount to a taking of the
property of a beer manufacturer, despite the fact that the
manufacturer's property was rendered nearly worthless as a result
of the regulation." In other words, government action in the form
of a regulation could not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment
taking.
17
However, Justice Harlan's view was rejected, and the door of
regulatory takings was opened, by Justice Holmes' comments in
the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'8 In that
case, which involved state regulation of coal mining, Justice
Holmes recognized that a government could not function if it were
required to pay for each decline in property value caused by regu-
lation.19 However, he also stated that "[t]he general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."20 Al-
though Justice Holmes' comments in Pennsylvania Coal were argu-
ably advisory in nature,21 they have become "a cornerstone of the
jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
establish any sort of restrictions on the power to regulate the use of land").
14. Joseph L Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38 (1964) (noting
that Justice Harlan derived Is theory "from the literal language of the [F]ifth
[A]mendment, which deals only with the 'taking of property").
15. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
16. Id. at 657, 668-669.
17. Id. at 668-669 (stating that "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropria-
tion of property for the public benefit.").
18. 260 U.S. 383 (1922).
19. Id. at 413.
20. Id. at 415.
21. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987)
(explaining that, "uncharactenstically, Justice Holmes provided the parties with an advisory
opinon discussing the general validity of the Act").
Justice Holmes's expansion of the meaning of a "talang" may be the result of the
conflict, beginning around the turn of the century, between "freewheeling growth and
expansion and an emerging concern that governmental regulation was needed
BOSSELMAN, ET" AL., supra note 2, at 104. Justice Holmes may have been concerned with
the fair mediation of this social conflict. To Justice Holmes, "[t]he job of the law
was not to fashion otherworldly conceptualisms but to assure that the battle of con-
flicting interests is 'carred on in a fair and equal way.'" Sax, supra note 14, at 40-41.
672 [Vol. 43:671
LUCAS V SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Clause," and have resulted in certain governmental regulations
being held to constitute a taking.' Yet, although Justice Holmes
set forth the general principle of regulatory takings, the articulation
of a standard of precisely when a particular regulation goes too far
was left for other courts.'
B. Attempts to Define Regulatory Takings: The Balancing Tests
In the several decades after Justice Holmes' comments m
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court struggled, and failed, to articulate a
clear standard for regulatory takings. Instead, the Court developed
broad balancing tests, applied to the facts in each case, to deter-
mine when a challenged regulation constitutes a taking.
1. Penn Central Balancing Test
One example of such a test was articulated in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.24 In that case, the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission had enacted a
regulation which effectively prohibited the construction of a multi-
story office building above the Grand Central Station Termmal.25
Penn Central, the owner of the Terminal, claimed that this regula-
tion amounted to a taking.26 The Court declined to characterize
the regulation as a taking based on its balancing of factors in a
three-part test: (1) the character of the governmental action in-
volved; (2) the extent to which the regulation interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the economic impact
of the regulation upon the property owner.27
a. Character of the Governmental Action
The first factor, the character of the governmental action,
involves the determination of whether the type of alleged taking is
characterized as a physical invasion or acquisition, or alternatively,
simply as an accepted form of governmental regulation. A govern-
mental action characterized as a physical invasion or acquisition of
private property is more likely to be found to constitute a taking
than an action characterized as a regulation "adjusting the benefits
22. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 508 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
23. RMcHARD . RODDEWIG & CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN, RESPONDING TO THE TAK-
INGS CHALLENGE: A GUIDE FOR OFICIALS AND PLANNERS 1 (1989).
24. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25. Id. at 116-117.
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id. at 124.
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and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."28
For example, this factor was applied in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,29 where the Court characterized a New
York law requiring landlords to permit cable television companies
to install cable wires on their property, upon payment of a nominal
fee, as a physical invasion/acquisition type of action, and therefore
held the statute to constitute a taking?" This decision is especially
indicative of the weight given to the characterization of government
actions as physical invasions or acquisitions since the property
intrusion involved was trivial.
b. Investment Backed Regulations
Another factor in the balance is the extent of the deprivation
of "distinct investment-backed expectations." 3' This factor requires
inquiry into the owner's contemplated use of, and thus expected
gain from, the property The governmental action may be consid-
ered a taking if the property owner demonstrates specific facts and
circumstances that show significant interference with a reasonable
expectation.32 In Penn Central, for example, the Court rejected
Penn Central's investment-backed expectations claim bacause it
found that Penn Central's expectations were based on using the
property as a railroad station, and that the enacted regulation did
not interfere with this use of the property 3
3
c. Economic Impact
The final factor considered in the Penn Central balancing test
is the size of the economic burden imposed on the property owner
by the governmental action. 4 This factor has also been packaged
as a focus on the diminution in property value, or on whether the
property owner is left with a reasonable economic use.35 The
Court in Penn Central noted the general principle that a diminution
in property value alone will not cause a regulation reasonably re-
lated to the goal of promoting the general public welfare to consti-
28. Id.
29. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
30. Id at 438.
31. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
32. Richard G. Wilkns, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional
Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 41 (1989).
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
34. Id. at 124.
35. RODDEWIG & DUERKSEN, supra note 23, at 2.
[Vol 43:671
LUCAS V SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
tute a talang.36 However, regulations that result in the complete
destruction of the property owner's rights can result in a taking be-
cause of the economic severity of such an action.
For example, the Penn Central Court cited Pennsylvania Coal,
as an instance where the severity of economic impact on the prop-
erty owner resulted in a taking.38 In Pennsylvania Coal, a state
regulation that prohibited coal mining on certain parcels of land
was held to be a taking as to the individual who owned the rights
to remove the coal from the land.39 In other words, the regulation
destroyed the entire economic interest of the owner of the mining
rights. Governmental actions which cause an economic impact this
severe can rise to the level of a taking.4'
2. The Agins Two Factor Test
A more recent articulation of the relevant factors balanced in
the takings analysis was advanced in Agins v. City of Tiburon.4"
In that case, property owners challenged local ordinances which
limited the number of residential dwellings that could be construct-
ed on their five-acre tract of land.42 The property owners argued
that such density restrictions foreclosed development of the land
and thus destroyed the value of the property 43 The Court an-
nounced a two-part test and determined that the challenged regula-
tion was not a taking." Under this test, a taking occurs if either
(1) the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest, or (2) the regulation denies a property owner of the entire
economically viable use of the land.45
Although these two factors were expressed as an either/or test,
most courts combine the state interest and economic use factors
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
37. Ii at 127.
38. kd at 127-128.
39. Pennsylvaia Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-415 (1922).
40. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (government's complete
destruction of a matenalman's lien in certain property constituted a talang); Hudson Coun-
ty Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (stating, by way of illustration, that
government height restrictions rendering property wholly useless constitute takings but
holding that a state may insist its water supply not be diverted through private contract
and that in such a case, no compensation is necessary).
41. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
42. 1d at 257.
43. Id. at 258.
44. Id. at 263.
45. Id at 260.
1993]
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into a single test, balancing the public benefit gamed by the regu-
lation against the private loss from the regulation of private proper-
ty 4 For example, in Agins the Court found that the density re-
strictions conferred a public benefit by ensuring the orderly devel-
opment of residential property 47 This public benefit was held to
outweigh the property owner's economic loss from restricted use
because not all developmental opportunities had been foreclosed."
In other words, the property still had economic value, despite the
density restrictions.
C. Caveat to the Balancing Tests: The Nuisance Exception and
the Harm/Benefit Test
As discussed, the determination of whether a particular regula-
tion constitutes a taking involves the consideration and balancing of
different factors. Thus, categories of certain types of regulations are
not considered per se takings or not takings. Instead, the finding
that a regulation constitutes a taking is the result of an ad hoc
factual inquiry However, the Supreme Court has consistently used
nuisance law principles to prevent certain types of government
action from being found to be a taking. 49 Nuisance law has effec-
tively created an exception to the application of the takings balanc-
ing tests. This exception has been referred to as the nuisance ex-
ception or the harm/benefit test.
1. Noxious Use Theory (the Nuisance Exception)
Noxious use theory is based on the premise that no one can
obtain a property right to injure or endanger the public." There-
46. RODDEWIG & DUERKsEN, supra note 23, at 3. See also Agins, 447 U.S. at 261
(stating that "the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests");
Pennsylvanua Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal, legislation
regulating coal mining was held to constitute a taking because the Court found that no
significant public benefit was advanced by the legislation; instead, the law was enacted
for the benefit of a small class of landowners. Ua at 398. Meanwhile, the regulation com-
pletely destroyed the value of the property right to mine coal. a L at 414. The Court held
that any plausible public benefit from the regulation did not outweigh the severity of the
economic Impact on the property owner. Id.
47. Agrns, 447 U.S. at 262.
48. Id.
49. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (not-
Ing that many prior cases have adhered to the nuisance exception).
50. This is based on the maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas," or "use your
own property in such a manner as not to miure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICrIO-
NARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990). See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (stating
that "all property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use
[Vol. 43:671
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fore, government regulation of activities which create potential
harm to the public will not constitute a taking, irrespective of the
economic effect on the regulated property owner." Basically, the
argument is that the government cannot "take" a right which the
property owner does not possess: 2
2. The Harm/Benefit Test
The harm/benefit test is considered a derivative53 or a mod-
em articulation s4 of noxious use theory. Simply put, government
regulation enacted to prevent a landowner from creating harm to
others will not constitute a taking.55 In contrast, government regu-
lation forcing a landowner to confer a benefit upon the public will
be considered a taking. 6 The rationale of the harm/benefit test,
according to Professor Frank Michelman, "is that compensation is
required when the public helps itself to good at private expense,
but not when the public simply requires one of its members to
stop making a nuisance of himself."57
D. 1986-1987 Term: Keystone and Nollan
In 1987, the Supreme Court issued two58 takings cases: Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicts,59 and Nolan v. Cal-
of it shall not be injurious to the community-).
51. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding a law which re-
quired the destruction of cedar trees within two miles of any apple orchard because the
trees were infected with cedar rust disease, which is extremely dangerous to apple trees).
52. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491
n.20 (1987) (stating that -since no individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it
asserts its power to enjoin the nusance-like activity").
53. David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call For Judicial Pro-
tection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 311, 323-24 (1988).
54. Sax, supra note 14, at 48.
55. Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 650, 664-666 (1958).
56. rd
57. Frank I. Mchelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1196 (1967).
58. During this term, the Supreme Court also issued First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). That case was significant in that
the Court held that the invalidation of a regulation which constitutes a taking is an made-
quate constitutional remedy. l at 322. Thus, the government must pay damages for the
period of time in which the regulation was effective. The government cannot avoid the
compensation requirement simply by subsequently vacating legislation which is held to be
a taking. Id
59. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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ifornia Coastal Commission.' These cases are significant because
they attempted to further clarify the relevant factors in the takings
analysis, and, as a result, received special academic attention. 1
1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis
The regulation challenged in Keystone was similar to the regu-
lation at issue in Pennsylvania Coal. In each case, Pennsylvania
enacted legislation prohibiting property owners from mining coal in
certain situations. 62 In Pennsylvania Coal the regulation was held
to be an invalid exercise of the police power.63 In Keystone, how-
ever, the Court distinguished the facts from those in Pennsylvania
Coal, and found the regulation to be a valid exercise of the po-
lice power, not a taking subject to the just compensation require-
ment.65
The Court was able to make such a distinction by noting the
differences in the purposes of each regulation.? In Pennsylvania
Coal, the regulations were considered to have been enacted to
protect certain private landowners because there was no evidence
that the mining prohibitions had been enacted for safety reasons or
other purposes tending to protect the public welfare.67 The mining
regulations in Keystone, however, were accompanied by specific
legislative findings that the regulations provided for the protection
and promotion of the health, safety and general welfare of the
citizens of Pennsylvania." The Court deferred to the legislative
findings and accepted the regulation's stated purpose of promoting
the public welfare.69 Thus, the Court held that the legislation in
Keystone, by aiming to protect the public welfare, advanced a
legitimate public interest, and therefore was a legitimate exercise of
the police power. Furthermore, the Court recognized that states
have a substantial interest in prohibiting activities which are similar
60. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
61. See generally Frank Michelman, Tajcdngs, 1987, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1600 (1988);
Douglas W. Knrec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak
Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630 (1988).
62. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 473-477.
63. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
64. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 480.
65. Id. at 506.
66. Id at 485.
67. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
68. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485.
69. Id at 485, 505-06.
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to nuisances. In making this statement, the Court signified its
acceptance of the generally accepted nuisance exception.
However, the Court did not stop its analysis with the finding
that the challenged regulation promoted a legitimate state inter-
est.71 The'Court went on to balance the advancement of the state
interest against the diminution in value of the property and the
investment-backed expectations of the property owners. 2 Essen-
tially, the Court conducted a balancing test using the factors from
the Penn Central and Agins tests.73 The Court concluded that the
public interest served by the regulation outweighed any economic
harm to the property owners since the regulation, as enacted, did
not deny the mine operators all "economically viable use" of their
land.74
This finding is significant because it raises the issue of what
constitutes a relevant property unit for the economic harm factor
analysis.75 In Keystone, the property owners asserted that the coal
which they were prohibited from mining because of the regulation
was a separate property unit.76 Thus, using this narrow definition
of the relevant property unit, the regulation completely destroyed
the value of that property unit. As a result, the property owners
argued, the complete destruction of economic value of the property
unit should outweigh the public purpose served, and thus the Court
should be required to find the regulation to be a taking.
The Court, however, refused to accept this narrow definition
of the relevant property unit.77 Instead, the Court adopted a broad
definition of the relevant property unit, stating that "where an
owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate
70. Id at 492.
71. I1
72. Id at 493.
73. Id. at 485, 493-502.
74. Id at 499, 501 (as to unmmed coal and the support estate, respectively).
75. The determination of the relevant property unit is significant because one factor m
the takings analysis requires the comparison of the value that has been "taken" from the
property with the value that remains after the regulation. Therefore, one of the critical
questions in the takings analysis is the determination of how to define the unit of proper-
ty "whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction." Id. at 497 (citing
Michelman, supra note 57, at 1165, 1192). See also nfra notes 156-159 (discussing
Jusice Blackmun's emphasis on the definition of property in his Lucas dissent).
76. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496.
77. Id at 497.
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must be viewed in its entirety " Thus, under this definition, the
complete destruction of one aspect of the property owner's rights
will not constitute a destruction of all economically viable use. 9
In summary, Keystone reaffirmed the tests developed m prior
takings cases such as Penn Central and Agins. In determining
whether a particular regulation constitutes a taking, the Court will
balance the public welfare advanced by the regulation against the
economic harm factors, including the diminution in value and the
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. In
evaluating the economic harm suffered by the property owner, the
Court will determine the economic harm caused to the aggregate
property rights, not the harm caused to one unique strand. Further-
more, nuisance law principles continue to provide an escape from
the balancing tests.
2. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nolan, the Court attempted to elaborate on the legitimate
state interest factor expressed in prior takings balancing tests, and
on the required nexus between the regulation and the goal of ad-
vancing the legitimate interest.8" The dispute in Nollan arose
when the Nollans were required to apply for a permit from the
California Coastal Commission for permission replace a beach
cottage with a three-bedroom house. The Commission approved the
permit subject to the condition that the Nollans grant the public an
easement to pass across a portion of their property 8" The condi-
tion was imposed because the commission feared that the newly
constructed house would contribute to "the development of 'a
"wall" of residential structures' that would prevent the public 'psy-
78. Id
79. Chef Justice Rehnquist dissented in Keystone based on his rejection of the
majority's broad definition of property. Id. at 519 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). He found
it significant that Pennsylvania's law created a separate property interest in the type of
coal at issue in the case. Id Cluef Justice Rehnquist based lus definition of the relevant
property interest upon the state law principles since "[p]roperty interests are not created
by the Constitution" but "are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law." Id. (citing Webb's Fabulous Phaarmcyles, Inc.
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). Since the challenged regulation rendered that particular state-created property nght
worthless, the Chief Justice asserted that it should constitute a talang. Id at 520-521.
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist would focus on unique strands of property rights, allowing
the complete destruction of one strand to amount to a taking.
80. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
81. Id at 828.
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chologically from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby
that they have every right to visit.'
8 2
Justice Scalia, writing for the. majority, held that the easement
was a "permanent physical occupation" and therefore was a tak-
ing.13 The issue then became whether the taking determination
could be avoided because the easement was only a condition of the
development permit.'$ The Court, recognizing that a broad range
of objectives are considered legitimate state interests, assumed that
protecting the public's ability to see the beach represented such a
legitimate state interest.8 5 However, Justice Scalia held that the
permit condition failed to substantially advance the legitimate state
interest of protecting the visual view of the coastline, and thus
constituted a taking."
The interesting portion of this decision is Justice Scalia's
description of the standard for review- that the regulation must
substantially advance a legitimate state interest.87 As Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent, Justice Scalia's heightened or semi-
strict scrutiny "creates an anomaly in the ordinary requirement that
a State's exercise of its police power need be no more that ratio-
nally based." 8
Because of the divergence in standards, Nollan could arguably
be considered a revolutionary takings case. However, Professor
Michelman has suggested that Nollan may simply be "a further
manifestation, albeit in somewhat surprising form, of the talismanic
force of 'permanent physical occupation' in takings adjudica-
tion."89 In other words, the heightened scrutiny may only apply to
those cases involving a permanent physical occupation.
Professor Kmiec disagrees with Michelman, and has pointed
out that Justice Scalia's heightened scrutiny may actually be less
protective of property rights than the law prior to Nollan. Before
Nollan, as discussed above, it was generally accepted that a perma-
nent physical occupation was a taking per se.' Under Nollan, a
82. d. at 828-29.
83. Id. at 832.
84. Id at 834.
85. Id at 834-35.
86. Id. at 839.
87. Id at 834.
88. Id at 865.
89. Michelman, supra note 61, at 1608.
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
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state could arguably obtain a permanent physical occupation, with-
out being considered a taking, if the required nexus was established
between the regulation and a legitimate state interest. 91
Kmiec explains this departure by suggesting that the height-
ened scrutiny applies not only to the fit between the regulatory
means and ends, but also to the appropriateness of placing public
burdens on a particular landowner.' He notes Justice Scalia's
statement that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Takings
Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' 93 Thus, according to Knuec,
Nollan signals an additional factor in the takings balance: concern
over whether a public burden has been appropriately placed on a
single landowner.' The significance of Michelman's and Kmiec's
observations is that the impact of Nollan on the development of
takings law is unclear.95
III. LUCAS V SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
A. Facts
In 1977, South Carolina enacted the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act following the lead of Congress' passage of the federal
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.9 South Carolina's law
required owners of coastal land qualifying as "critical areas" to
obtain permits from the Coastal Council if they desired to use the
land in a way different from the way the land was used on the
date of enactment.97
During the late 1970's, David Lucas and others had begun
extensive development of residential homes on the Isle of Palms, a
barrier island near Charleston, South Carolina.9" To this end, in
1986 David Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of
Palms for $975,000.9 At the time of purchase, no portion of
91. Knuec, supra note 61, at 1650.
92. Id at 1651.
93. Nollan v. Califorma Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835-36 n.4 (1977).
94. Kuec, supra note 61, at 1651.
95. See RODDEWIG & DUERKSEN, supra note 23, at 8 (stating that Nollan "may end
up being nothing more than a garden-vanety exactions case").
96. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992).
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id
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these two lots qualified as a "critical area" under the 1977 Coastal
Zone Management Act, and the surrounding lots had been devel-
oped for residential use. Thus, Lucas was not required to obtain a
permit for residential development on his lots.
However, in 1988 South Carolina amended the Coastal Zone
Management Act.1" The amendment prohibited construction of
occupiable improvements in certain areas experiencing erosion. The
lots purchased by Lucas in 1986 were included in these erosion
areas. Therefore, as a result of the amendment, Lucas was unable
to fulfill his intention of building residential structures on Ins lots.
In response to this construction bar, Lucas filed suit in the
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the prohi-
bition constituted a taking of his property without just compensa-
tion.' While Lucas did not challenge South Carolina's ability to
regulate the beachfront property under the authority of the police
power, he did argue that the Act completely destroyed the value of
his property, and thus entitled him to compensation. The Court of
Common Pleas agreed, stating that the "prohibition 'deprive[d]
Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, eliminated
the unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them valueless.'" 1
As a result, the Court of Common Pleas held that the Act effected
a taking, and ordered South Carolina to pay Lucas
$1,232,387.50.03
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed, and held that the Act did not constitute a taking based on
noxious use theory "04 The South Carolina Supreme Court stated,
citing Mugler v. Kansas, that regulations enacted to "prevent sen-
ous public harm" are not takings, irrespective of the regulation's
effect on property value.105 Because Lucas did not challenge the
validity of the Act, the court felt bound to accept the "'uncontest-
ed findings' of the South Carolina legislature that new con-
struction in the coastal zone - such as [Lucas] intended - threat-
ened this public resource."0 6 Thus, because the Coastal Zone
Management Act was enacted to prevent a public harm, the court
concluded that it did not constitute a taking.' 7 The U.S. Supreme
100. Id
101. Id. at 2890.
102. IAt (citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. 1&
105. Id.
106. id
107. Notably, two South Carolina Supreme Court justices dissented. Although these
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Court granted certiorari in an attempt to clarify the appropriate test
for regulatory takings law. l"
B. The Majority Opinion - Justice Scalia
Writing for the majority, which included Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor and Thomas, Justice
Scalia reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded
the case for further proceedings.'0 9 In so doing, Justice Scalia an-
nounced a categorical rule: a regulation that demes a landowner of
all economically beneficial use will constitute a taking unless the
regulation prohibits a use that was already impermissible under
nuisance law 11O
In his articulation of the categorical rule, Justice Scalia first
noted that, generally, the determination of whether a regulation is a
taking depends on "ad hoc, factual inquiries" and not on any set
formula.' However, he identified two categories of regulatory
action which have been deemed to constitute takings without fact-
specific inquiries. First, he noted that regulations resulting in a
"physical invasion," no matter how small the invasion or how great
the public purpose, have been considered takings.12 Second, rely-
ing on Agins, he maintained that regulations denying the owner of
"all economically beneficial or productive use of land" have been
categorically treated as takings. 3
Justice Scalia then attempted to justify the position that regula-
tions denying all economic use are takings. First, he borrowed
former Justice Brennan's suggestion that total deprivation of eco-
nomic use may be the equivalent of a physical taking, at least
justices recognized the nuisance exception in talangs law, they maintained that the
Beachfront Management Act's primary purpose was not the prevention of a nuisance, but
"the promotion of tourism and the creation of a 'habitat for indigenous flora and fauna,*
[and thus] could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement." Id.
Also of interest is the fact that the South Carolina legislature amended the
Beachfront Management Act in 1990, after the oral arguments before the South Carolina
Supreme Court, but before its opinion was issued, to provide for the issuance of "special
permits" for the construction or reconstruction of residential structures in -critical areas" in
certain circumstances. Id at 2890-91. Thus, Lucas potentially could obtain permission to
build residential homes on his lots via a "special permit." Id at 2890.
108. Id
109. Id at 2902.
110. Id at 2899.
111. Id at 2893.
112. Id
113. Id
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from the landowner's point of view."' Secondly, Justice Scalia
suggested that the functional argument against regulatory takings -
that government could not go on if it were required to pay for all
diminutions in property values caused by its regulation - is not
applicable in the "relatively rare situations where the government
has deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial uses."115
Finally, Justice Scalia maintained that the compensation require-
ment for regulations rendering property economically worthless is
justified because these regulations "carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." 16
Essentially, Justice Scalia's concern in this third justification
highlights problems with the established takings principles of nox-
ious use theory and the harm/benefit test. Justice Scalia conceded
that prior takings cases recognized that "'harmful or noxious uses'
of property may be proscribed by government regulation without
the requirement of compensation."' 17 However, he also pointed
out the difficulty created by this standard by noting that "the dis-
tinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regu-
lation is often in the eye of the beholder.""' For example, the
construction ban on Lucas' beachfront property may have been
enacted to prevent harm to South Carolina's ecological resources.
Alternatively, however, the regulation may have been enacted to
attain the benefits of an ecological preserve, including the promo-
tion of tourism revenue or securing "a natural healthy environment
for the citizens of South Carolina to spend leisure time which
serves their physical and mental well-being.""
9
Because of this difficulty in determining whether a regulation
is harm-preventing or benefit-conferring, Justice Scalia determined
that the state court's reliance on the legislative pronouncement of a
harm-preventing purpose was unjustified.' 20 Justice Scalia stated
that "[a] fortion the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justifi-
cation cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule
114. Ie at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Electnc Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
652 (1981) (Brennan, L, dissenting)).
115. Id
116. Id at 2895.
117. Id at 2897.
118. Id
119. Id at 2898 I.i.
120. Id at 2899.
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that total regulatory takings must be compensated."' His rejec-
tion of the state court's deference to the stated legislative purpose
was based on a concern that such an approach would nullify the
entire concept of regulatory takings created in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon." If a legislature could simply avoid a takings
challenge by declaring a harm-preventing purpose, there would be
no limit to the state's exercise of the police power.
As a result of this concern, Justice Scalia pronounced the
categorical rule. He stated:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the pro-
scribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with. n
3
In other words, a government will avoid the just compensation
requirement in cases of total economic destruction only if the reg-
ulation prohibits uses that were not part of the landowner's title
because of restrictions already imposed by nuisance principles. This
framework is used because, historically, according to Justice Scalia,
property owners have recognized that their property rights are held
subject to an implied limitation imposed by legitimate exercises of
the police power."n However, Justice Scalia suggests that the no-
tion that this implied limitation can be used by a government to
"subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsis-
tent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture."125
By way of illustration, Justice Scalia explained that the owner
of a nuclear power plant could not claim a taking under the rule if
told to remove the plant's operations from its land because of a
discovery that the plant was on an earthquake fault." 6 Even
though this regulation may eliminate all economic value in that
property, the regulation does not prohibit a use that would have
been otherwise permissible, since the existence of the nuclear plant
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id at 2900.
126. ld
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could have been challenged under nuisance law principles.
Justice Scalia did note, however that the judicial inquiry under
the rule requires analyzing the factors normally considered in the
application of nuisance law. 7 Such factors include the degree of
harm to public lands and resources posed by the owner's proposed
activities; the social value of the owner's activities and their suit-
ability to the locality in question; and the relative ease with which
the potential harm could be eliminated through precautionary mea-
sures.'2 Thus, Justice Scalia renders the inquiry for total regu-
latory takings essentially the inquiry required by state nuisance law
As a result, the Court remanded the case for consideration of
South Carolina nuisance law principles. Justice Scalia noted that on
remand under the categorical rule, South Carolina will be required
to demonstrate that construction of residential homes on Lucas' lots
would have constituted a nuisance under state nuisance law 19 If
the residential development on Lucas' lots is considered a nuisance,
then the proposed property use is not a right to which Lucas is
entitled as a property owner. Thus, if Lucas did not have the right
to develop his property because of nuisance law principles, then
the Beachfront Management Act did not prohibit a use to which he
was entitled, and will not constitute a taking, regardless of the
effect on the property's value.
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed with the framework of the majority's
takings analysis in substance.1" However, Justice Kennedy added
three observations which may become relevant on remand and in
future takings cases. First, he expressed reservations as to the as-
sumption that beachfront property loses all economic value because
of a residential development restriction.3 Secondly, he added
that the uniqueness of coastal property may present special con-
cerns, and thus permit government regulation of land uses beyond
what nuisance law might otherwise allow. 32 Finally, Justice Ken-
nedy added that a means-ends analysis should also be considered
in addition to the categorical rule. 33 Specifically, he noted that in
127. Id at 2901.
128. Id
129. Id at 2901-02.
130. Id.
131. Id at 2903.
132. Id
133. Id at 2904.
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the case at bar the lots in question had originally been zoned for
residential use, and that South Carolina did not regulate the proper-
ty until most other lots on the island had been developed."3
Thus, the burden of the regulation rested almost entirely on the
remaining lots, including those owned by Lucas. Justice Kennedy
felt that this inequitable burden should be one of the factors
weighed in the balance. 35
D. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justice Blackmun vigorously dissented from the majority opin-
ion, stating, "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a
mouse."' 6s According to Justice Blackmun, the Court unnecessari-
ly created the sweeping categorical rule in order to decide a nar-
row case.
137
His disagreement with the majority starts with the decision to
review the takings issue. First, he states that the issue was not ripe
for decision in the absence of a final decision regarding the permit-
ted uses of the property 13' Because the Beachfront Management
Act was amended in 1990 to allow permits to build in certain
circumstances, Justice Blackinun believes Lucas' takings claim will
not be ripe until he has been denied use after pursuing this admm-
istrative remedy 139 Additionally, Justice Blackmun criticizes the
Court's reliance on the assumption that the construction ban ren-
dered Lucas' lots economically worthless."O According to Justice
Blackmun, Lucas still retains attributes of ownership, such as the
right to exclude others, and therefore has not suffered a complete
economic deprivation. 41
However, the substance of Justice Blackmun's dissent goes
much deeper. First, Justice Blackmun criticizes Justice Scalia's lack
of deference to the South Carolina legislature in the absence of a
challenge by Lucas. 42 He cites United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co.43 for the proposition that "the existence of facts sup-
134. Id.
135. 1&
136. Id
137. Id.
138. 1d at 2906.
139. l at 2907.
140. Id at 2908.
141. Id
142. I& at 2909.
143. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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porting the legislative judgment is to be presumed."'" As a re-
suit, Justice Blackmun would accept the Legislature's statements
that the Act's purpose was to prevent harm to life and property
absent a challenge to that stated purpose. 45  Thus, Justice
Blackmun would permit the legislative distinction between harm-
preventing and benefit-conferring regulations.
Secondly, Justice Blackmun objects to the adoption of a cate-
gorical rule.1" He notes that takings inquiries involve balancing
several factors, and not decisions based on per se categories.
147
He points out that although regulations which eliminate all eco-
nonucally viable uses of property weigh heavily in favor of a
taking determination, the Court has never held that there is no pub-
lic interest that would outweigh this substantial private harm.'
Thus, Justice Blacknun rejects Justice Scalia's suggestion that
Agins supports a per se rule for total regulatory takings.49
Moreover, Justice Blackmun objects to the majority's attempt
to incorporate public interest factors into the takings analysis by
permitting the destruction of all economic value without compensa-
tion only if the regulation prohibits uses that would have been
prohibited by nuisance law "5 He notes that prior cases have re-
jected the notion that governmental regulatory power "turns on
whether the prohibited activity is a common law nuisance."15' In-
stead, the Court has permitted the legislature to determine what
regulation is necessary for the protection of public health and safe-
ty52 Thus, by making the takings analysis turn on whether the
regulated activity constitutes a nuisance, the Court is putting the
judiciary in the position of second-guessing legislatures. On this
point, Justice Blackmun challenges Justice Scalia's justification for
the categorical rule based on the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween harm-preventing and benefit-conferring legislation.'53 Jus-
tice Blackmun notes Justice Scalia's doubt that the legislative judg-
ment can provide "the desired 'objective, value-free basis' for
144. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152).
145. Id
146. Id at 2909-10.
147. Id at 2910.
148. Id
149. Id at 2911 n.11.
150. Id. at 2912.
151. Id at 2912-13.
152. Id at 2913.
153. Id,
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upholding a regulation. " 's However, according to Justice
Blackmun, "[i]n determining what is a nuisance at common law,
state courts make exactly the decision that the Court finds so trou-
bling when made by the South Carolina General Assembly today-
they determine whether the use is harmful."'55
Additionally, Justice Blackmun points out that the key determi-
nation under the categorical rule is the definition of property "5
The standard of deprivation of all economic use cannot be ascer-
tamed without an understanding of the relevant property unit in-
volved. He explains that "whether the owner has been deprived of
all economic value of his property will depend on how 'property'
is defined." 57 Blacknun asserts that there is no objective way
for the Court to make this determination. As an example, he refers
to the different definitions of the relevant property unit put forth
by different justices in Keystone.a15  He notes that "[w]e have
long understood that any land-use regulation can be characterized
as the 'total' deprivation of an aptly defined entitlement Al-
ternatively, the same regulation can always be characterized as a
mere 'partial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered ownership of
the landholding affected by the regulation." 59 Thus, according to
Justice Blacknun, the categorical rule is flawed because of the
ability to manipulate the rule through differing definitions of prop-
erty
Finally, Justice Blackmnun challenges Justice Scalia's under-
standing of the historical understandings of the Takings Clause. 6"
Justice Blackmun notes that the Talangs Clause originally did not
extend to regulations of property, regardless of the economic ef-
fect,16 ' and that his reading of history does not "indicate any
common law limit on the State's power to regulate harmful uses
even to the point of destroying all economic value." 62 Thus,
Justice Blacknun contests Justice Scalia's assertion that the implied
limitations on property rights, resulting from the police power, do
not extend to the complete destruction of economic value.
154. Id
155. Id at 2914.
156. Id at 2913.
157. Id
158. Id at 2913-14.
159. Id. at 2913.
160. Id at 2914-17.
161. Id at 2915.
162. Id at 2916.
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E. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens' dissent is similar to Justice Blackmun's m that
he questions the majority's abandonment of the balancing tests in
favor of a categorical rule.1 63 He claims that neither Pennsylvana
Coal nor Agins supports the majority's focus solely on the eco-
nomic factor.1" Those cases, he asserts, emphasized that the eco-
nomic factor is only one factor in the takings analysis. 5
Justice Stevens also notes problems with the categorical rule
based on the definition of property " He expresses fear for the
mampulation of the categorical rule because of the "elastic nature
of property rights."" He notes that courts may define the prop-
erty interest broadly so as to avoid the finding of a total regulatory
taking.'" However, he also notes the possibility of developers
and investors marketing special limited estates to take advantage of
the categorical rule.' 69
Furthermore, like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens criticizes
the lack of deference given to the Legislature by the majority 170
Justice Stevens suggests that this approach is unwise because legis-
latures are equipped to deal with "the special exigencies of the
moment."' For example, he notes the necessity of the legislative
police power to deal with emergencies, such as Hurricane Hugo,
which caused more than $6 billion in property damage in South
Carolina.172 Thus, he maintains that the legislatures must have the
ability to regulate and redefine property interests in order to imple-
ment the constant evolution of human experiences and understand-
ings. For example, he asserts that legislatures are able to redefine
property interests to take into account new societal concerns in
areas such as endangered species, wetlands, and coastal lands.'
13
Justice Stevens argues that the categorical rule "freezes the State's
common law, denying the legislature much of its traditional power
163. I at 2918.
164. M,
165. Id.
166. Id at 2919.
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id
170. Id at 2922.
171. Id
172. Id at 2925.
173. Id at 2921-22.
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to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property" 74
Finally, Justice Stevens disagrees with the majority's failure to con-
sider one of the factors in the traditional takings analysis, the char-
acter of the regulatory action. 75
Justice Stevens also notes that the character of the regulatory
action factor takes into account the purpose of the Takings Clause,
which "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole." 17 6 He notes that the
cases finding physical invasions, no matter how minute, to consti-
tute takings are consistent with this purpose since a "physical tak-
ing entails a certain amount of 'singling out.''n However, Jus-
tice Stevens notes that in this case, the Beachfront Management
Act did not single out Lucas, as the owner of undeveloped land, to
bear the burden of developmental regulation. s The Act also pro-
hibited owners of developed land from reconstructing their struc-
tures if destroyed. Thus, because the Act inflicted burdens on both
the owners of developed and undeveloped land, Justice Stevens
asserted that the character of the regulation was not in the nature
of an expropriation on a single class of owners, and therefore
weighed against the finding of a taking. 79
IV ANALYSIS
A. Doctrinal Shifts
Viewed against the backdrop of prior takings cases, Lucas is
seemingly a significant decision in takings jurisprudence because it
signals the Court's doctrinal shift. For example, the categorical
rule, as noted in the dissenting opinions, is an aberration of the
balancing tests developed in Pennsylvania Coal and Agins, and
continued in Keystone. The categorical rule, then, could arguably
signal the doctrinal shift from fact-specific balancing tests to the
174. Id at 2921.
175. Id at 2922-23. Justice Stevens does note, however, that the majority considered
two of the traditional factors: the econouc npact and the reasonable-investment backed
expectations. "fTMhe categorical rule addresses a regulation's 'economuc impact, while the
nuisance exception recognizes that ownership brings with it only certain 'expectations."-
Id at 2922.
176. Id at 2923 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
177. Id
178. Id at 2924.
179. Id
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development of per se categories. As Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion notes, this development may be on shaky ground, given
that the entire concept of regulatory takings has a questionable
foundation in Constitutional mterpretation.lis However, accepting
the validity of regulatory takings, as the Court has since Pennsylva-
nia Coal, the real concern with the development of per se catego-
ries lies in the lack of deference to legislative judgment, and thus,
the removal of a portion of the legislature's regulatory power.
Both dissenting opinions m Lucas question this lack of tradi-
tional deference to legislative judgment regarding the purposes and
goals of a challenged regulation.' 8' Justice Scalia attempts to jus-
tify the lack of deference on the ground that reliance on the
Legislature's announced purpose would nullify all regulatory tak-
ings claims since the government could draft the legislative history
to fit under the nuisance exception simply by stating a harm-pre-
venting purpose."s Justice Blackmun, however, counters that the
categorical rule with its nuisance exception merely puts the Court
m the position to determine whether a particular use is harmful,
since nuisance law is essentially a determination whether a certain
use is harmful." 3 Thus, he seems to assert that the Court is tak-
ing away legislative power to regulate what it determines to be a
harmful use, and replacing it with the judicial power to permit
total regulatory takings, provided the regulated use is harmful un-
der nuisance law principles. As a result, the focus of governmental
regulatory power shifts from the legislative judgment to the pnnci-
ples of nuisance law.
Given the separation of powers between the judicial and legis-
lative branches, and the recognized broad scope of the legislative
police power, this lack of deference gives rise to valid concerns
and justifies Justice Stevens' reference to a return to the era of
Lochner v. New York."' However, instead of indicating a return
to "Lochnerizing," Lucas may signal the Court's explicit recogni-
tion of a residual federal category of property While property
rights are defined by state law, it may be that the Constitution,
180. Id at 2914-17.
181. Id at 2909 (Blacknun, L, dissenting); Id at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id at 2899.
183. Id at 2914.
184. Id. at 2921 (citing Prne-Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980)
(Marshall, ., dissenting), which stated that refusals to defer to legislative determinations
represents "a return to the era of Lochner when common-law rights were im-
mune from revision by State or Federal Government").
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
through the Takings Clause, creates a minimum federal standard
below which state definitions may not fall.' 5
The residual federal category of property may be consistent
with the anti-majoritanan concerns implicit in the Takings
Clause.1 6
By consistent division of authority, the Founders sought to
prevent concentration of governmental power against prop-
erty rights. Under such division, the polity 'will be broken
into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that
the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little
danger from interested combinations of the majority' The
very structure of government would ensure that the rights
of property would not be nullified 'by the superior force of
an interested and overbearing majority' 187
In other words, the just compensation requirement may "counteract
the majoritanan tendency to isolate individual citizens for dispro-
portionate burdens.""'8
Based on these anti-majoritarian concerns, the lack of deference
to legislative judgment may be justifiable in those situations where
legislative rule has caused complete economic destruction to a
property interest. If a property owner is subject to unlirmted gov-
ernmental regulation, the requirement that the regulation be harm-
preventing in order to avoid characterization as a taking is mean-
ingless and subjects the individual property owner to the whim of
the majority "89 However, by requiring complete economic de-
struction to invoke the categorical rule, Lucas allows for the con-
tinued broad governmental regulatory powers which are implicit in
the police power. Thus, Justice Scalia's lack of deference may be
justifiable when a regulation has eliminated all economic value in a
185. See Knuec, supra note 61, at 1642.
186. Id at 1641.
187. B. SCHWARTZ, THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY 21 (1965) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 51, 10 (James Madison)).
188. Krmec, supra note 61, at 1640.
189. In fact, Justice Scalia made this point in Lucas, stating:
A fortiorz the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the
basis for departing from our categoncal rule that total regulatory takings must
be compensated. If it were, departure would always be allowed. The South
Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify [Pennsylvania
Coal's] affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police pow-
er.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
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property interest because of anti-majoritarian concerns, but may be
unjustified when the regulation has only partially devalued a prop-
erty interest given the broad police power. Because the rule's lack
of deference fits into this framework, it seems justified under a
residual federal category of property rights theory
Further evidence of the shift towards a recognition of minmum
federal property rights comes to light when Lucas is considered
with Nollan. In Nollan, Justice Scalia advanced the standard that a
regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest to
avoid characterization as a taking." Although Nollan may sim-
ply be a result of a physical invasion analysis, it may also signal
the Court's recognition of anti-majoritanan concerns m the Takings
clause, leading to a residual federal category of property rights.
B. Practical Realities
While the doctrinal shifts are of scholastic note, the practical
impact of Lucas on governmental regulatory power appears to be
minor.19 For example, the categorical rule does not make clear
the relevant property unit against which the decline in value is to
be measured."9 Thus, the obvious defense to a total regulatory
taking, as suggested by Justice Stevens,193 is the use of the broad
definition of property and the denial of a complete economic de-
struction of that broad property right. Since Keystone provides
support for a broad definition of the relevant property interest,"9'
it seems that few regulations will be found to constitute a -taking
because of a complete destruction of economic value. Under a
broad property definition, the government should almost always be
able to argue that at least one strand of property rights has not
been destroyed by the challenged regulation.
As a result of the difficulty in alleging a complete destruction
of economic value, Lucas is unlikely to set off a wave of challeng-
190. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
191. Tis is not to suggest that recent developments in takings law are insignificant.
Takings law has come to the forefront in this era of environmental regulation. For exam-
ple, U.S. Clams Court Cluef Judge Loren Smith has been an aggressive user of the
Takings Clause in an effort to put a brake on federal and state regulation of business and
property. Tom Castleton, U.S. Clans Court Crusader Puts Property Rights Up Front,
CONN. LAW TRIB., Aug. 31, 1992, at 22. Thus, cases like Lucas and developments like
the categoncal rule signal the beginnings of major developments in takings law.
192. Lucas, 112 S. CL at 2894 n.7 (opinon by Scalia, J.); Id at 2913 (Blaclanun, J.,
dissenting); Id at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id at 2919.
194. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
1993]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
es to land use regulations. Thus, Justice Stevens' fears of Lucas
inhibiting the government's ability to enact regulations to protect
interests such as endangered species, wetlands, and coastal
lands " ' seems unfounded. Under a broad property definition, it
will be a rare case when the entire bundle of property rights have
been rendered economically worthless.
In fact, it is unclear whether even Lucas can claim on remand
that his entire property interest has been rendered economically
worthless.1" Although the Beachfront Management Act may pre-
vent Lucas from building residential homes on his lots, as an own-
er he still maintains the essential property right - the right to ex-
clude others." This right to exclude others could arguably have
some value, and therefore could prevent Lucas from claiming com-
plete destruction of economic value. Thus, on remand even Lucas
may not be entitled to invoke the categorical rule.
Another practical reality is that the existence of the nuisance
exception will cause courts to balance factors similar to those bal-
anced in the traditional takings cases. This results from the analysis
required under nuisance law For example, according the Restate-
ment Second of Torts, the determination of whether an activity is a
nuisance entails a gravity/utility balance.'" In this analysis, the
gravity of the harm resulting from the activity is balanced against
the social utility of that use. Factors considered on the gravity side
include the extent of harm involved, the character of the harm
involved, the social value that the law attaches to that type of use
or enjoyment, the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment to
the character of the locality and the burden on the person harmed
in avoiding the harm." Factors considered on the utility side of
the balance include the social value that the law attaches to the
primary purpose of the conduct, the suitability of the conduct to
the character of the locality and the impracticability of preventing
or avoiding the harm from the conduct.2""
These nuisance factors are similar to the traditional takings
195. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
196. The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act completely destroyed the value of Lucas' property interest Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2894 n.7. However, on remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court need not be bound by
this constraint. Id at 2903, 2908 n.6.
197. d at 2908.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-28 (1979).
199. Id § 822.
200. Id § 828.
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balancing factors developed m Penn Central, Agins and Keystone:
balancing the public welfare advanced by a particular regulation
against the economic harm suffered by the property owner. For
example, David Lucas' construction of residential homes on the
Isle of Palms could, arguably, fall into the category of a nuisance
based on the Restatement factors. Although the construction ban
may cause severe harm to Lucas, and even though the law may
place a high value on the development of residential homes, barrier
islands may not be the appropriate location for this type of use m
light of the environmental danger created, and as a result this
particular development may constitute a nuisance. If this were
analyzed under the traditional takings analysis, the court would
consider whether the environmental safety advanced by the con-
struction ban outweighs the economic harm suffered because of the
prohibition. The difference between nuisance and takings law is
that in nuisance cases the competition is between different property
owners, whereas in takings cases the competition is between the
property owner and the government. In the end, however, both the
nuisance analysis and the traditional takings analysis evaluate com-
peting uses and interests inproperty rights, and attempt to reach a
compromise in this competition of interests..
Justice Scalia, in dictum, suggests that Lucas' developmental
activities are not likely to be considered a nuisance.2 °1 However,
the important point is that the factors considered in a nuisance
analysis are similar to those evaluated in the traditional takings
analysis. Recognition of this similarity is supnsmgly absent from
all the opinions in Lucas.
V CONCLUSION
The full impact that Lucas' categorical rule will have on tak-
ings law is unclear. However, until future takings cases firmly
clarify issues such as the relevant property definition, it seems that
Lucas will have little impact on governmental regulatory power.
Moreover, application of the nuisance exception will require courts
to consider factors similar to those considered in traditional takings
cases. The significance of Lucas is the Court's doctrinal shift from
balancing tests to a per se rule, and the lack of deference to legis-
lative judgment that accompanies such a rule. Whether this lack of
deference can be explained by some sort of residual federal proper-
201. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
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ty right, and what the ultimate effect of such a residual right on
the police power will be, remains for consideration m future cases.
Thus, Lucas will not, by itself, set off an "earthquake" on the
foundation of governmental regulatory power, but it certainly can
be called a "tremor"
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